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SEFELA SA LfTSAMAYANAHA (1) - THE WARTIME EXPERIENCES
OF POTLAKO KITCHENER LEBALLO.
"Oh no! Don't be a child man! I don't mean that!
What I mean is that if they won't believe the truth,
then you must tell them a lie."
Cell-mate to Monare in "Blanket Boy's Moon" (2)
For over a decade now social historians in South Africa have done
a commendable job of inserting the common man and woman into
history. Instead of painting exaggerated pictures of famous
individuals, the emphasis has been on the lives of ordinary
people.
Up to a point this paper reverts to the methodology that has
fallen into disfavour. It focuses primarily on the life of a
single individual - who to this day maintains a position of
reverence, albeit precariously, in the pantheon of South African
radical names.
In spite of this ostensible relapse, the intention is similar to
that of contemporary, popular social history. The purpose is to
contribute to the demystification of history, to emphasise the
importance of a shift away from rulers, governors and leaders,
including leaders of social struggles.
This is a brief and incomplete account of the war experiences of
Potlako Kitchener Leballo - an individual who is widely regarded
as a hero of resistance, but who is simultaneously a parody of
leadership and at times its traducer, invaluable to historians
and to history because of the way in which he constantly
betrayed the absurdity, the hypocricy and the staggering human
frailty of the modern leader.
In later years Leballo gained reknown, not only as a
controversial leader, but also as a mesmerising orator. It is
evident, too, that he was a man who loved to dramatise, to
command the centre of attention, to captivate listeners with
impassioned stories. Having grown up in a world of oral culture
it is not surprising that he expressed himself best in the spoken
rather than the written word. Leballo's favourite subject was
himself - as is the case with most human beings, especially those
with the kind of exaggerated self-esteem which makes them feel
entitled to lead others.
Leballo's autobiographical sketches, which have been recorded
piecemeal by numerous authors, are festooned with exaggerations,
misinformation, ambiguities. However, he was an intelligent
fabricator of information, with a talent for fitti'ng a story into
its appropriate social context. This alone makes him an exciting
subject for a social biography, since the reconstruction of his
life and its links to the social structure provide stiff tests
for the sleuthing and analytical skills of the researcher.
Potlako Kitchener Leballo was born in Lesotho (Basutoland) on
19th December in the early 1920's. It is one of the many
inconsistencies in Leballo's recorded life history - this one
rather innocuous - that the day and month of his birth can be
established with certainty while much vagueness surrounds the
year of his birth.
If there is uncertainty about the precise date of Leballo's
birth, by contrast there is reasonable clarity about the broader
social conditions into which he was born. By the 1920's Lesotho
was well on its way to being incorporated into the wider
capitalist economy of the subcontinent, in what to this day
remains its characteristic form: as a labour pool for the mining
industry. Changes in social formations, however, tend to be
prolonged painful affairs. (3)
During the years of Leballo's childhood the community in which he
lived was an uncomfortable amalgum between two competing modes of
production. If capitalism was beginning to gain a decisive upper
hand, with agricultural commodity production and migrant labour
being the ascendant forms of social relations in Leballo's little
village of Lifelekoaneng (near Mafeteng), pre-capitalist
traditions, values, cultures nevertheless exerted a powerful
psychological force. Not that they operated free of
competition. They were engaged in a constant war of attrition
with rival ideological imputs that were quite clearly imperialist
and capitalist in origin and inclination. Perhaps the major rival
ideological fores at the time was the Christian religion.
This conflict between rival traditions was played out within
Leballo's immediate family. His father was an Anglican catechist
who taught at St. Paul's Mission in Tsikoane. (4) Potlako however
was the youngest of fourteen children, and it comes as no
surprise that he was estranged from his absentee father. As was
often the custom in Lesotho households Leballo was raised by his
extended family, his father's two older brothers being the most
influential figures in his young life.
The one uncle, Motsoasele, remained a pagan until his death in
1947. In his latter years he earned a fearful reputation in the
neighbouring districts as a traditional healer of considerable
power. Motsoasele had fought and lost an eye at the Battle of
Qalabane in the Gun War of 1880. His proto-nationalist sentiments
did not subside with the defeat of Mokoanyane his chief, and
forty years later he spent a while in jail for defying the
colonial administration.
By contrast the other uncle, Nathaniel Leballo, was an austere
pastor who had studied at an Anglican school in the Eastern Cape.
Nathaniel exerted a heavy—handed discipline on his nephew, and it
was probably at his bidding that Leballo himself received a
rigorous Christian education first at St. Saviour school in
Hlotse, and then after being expelled, at Masite Institution,
near Morija. Hannah Stanton, the well-known missionary at Lady
Selborne gave a firsthand description of the Spartan conditions
and ascetic atmosphere that pervaded this mountainside retreat:
And so here in Masite in the middle of Southern Africa
there is this small centre of intensive prayer and
sacrifice. Here there is reconciliation and reparation,
in the sense of the crucified life of complete self-
giving lived out here on earth ... (5)
Motsoasele, however, was able to console himself with the
knowledge that the westernised influences on Leballo were being
offset by the especially close relationship that had developed
between himself and the child. From a practical point of view
Motsoasele was able to notch up as a triumph the fact that he
succeeded in abducting his nephew from his school and smuggling
him to an initiation lodge (called "mophato" in Sesotho) at
Pitseng in the Leribe area. This is actually what cost Leballo
his position at St. Saviours. It was mission policy to refuse to
re—admit pupils who had run away to go to initiation school
("lebollo"). (6)
Leballo claimed never to have made any practical use of the
ceremonies he underwent or the teachings he received at
initiation school It is both impolite and methodoligically
unsound to gainsay one's informant, but as this very
contravention will show, it is essential to subject all Leballo's
statements to vigorous processes of verification.
To this day initiation ceremonies in Lesotho are shrouded in
extreme secrecy. However, one important aspect of "lebollo",
which is particularly relevant to this paper, has been well
documented by a number of anthropologists. Some time during the
ceremony every initiate must give a solo recitation known as
"lithoko tso makqloane" — male initiation praises. (7) Charles
Adams has described these praise poems in the following words:
"These praises build personal images of identity; rather than
report historical facts, they are imaginery and wishful
constructions directed at what the intiate feels will influence
his future life." (own emphasis) (8) Coplan elucidates: "These
compositions do not ... focus on real events persons or places,
but locate the composer as prospective hero in the midst of
circumstances that in Basotho social experience are very real
indeed." (9)
Undoubtedly there were other psychological and practical forces
at work that were to compel the adult Leballo to be deliberately
obscure or inflate when it came to recounting certain events in
his life. However, it would appear to be too much of a
coincidence that the specific form of this centrepiece of Basotho
oral culture - "likotho tso.makoloane" - is identical to the form
that Leballo's later fabrications were to take.
The family is the major conduit through which decisive historical
processes must pass before they are assimilated by the psyche of
the average modern child. Thus it was because of Leballo's deep
emotional attachment to Motsoasele and the experiences he shared
with the old patriarch that the militant populism of a backward-
looking Africanist ethos was instilled in the boy. At the same
time the devout Christian values of his other uncle, Nathaniel
(and of his parents), with their emphasis on restraint and
humiliation, were to have a countervailing effect on the young
mind.
On the one hand, cultural pride, proto—nationalism, a spirit of
independence, a mood of defiance. On the other hand, imitation of
the white man's customs, rejection of the past, reconciliation to
social and economic inferiority, resignation to suffering. These
contrary influences, relatively inert in themselves, like
potassium and water, were bound to be explosive when mixed.
Most children growing up within a capitalist social order are
deprived and unsettled. Growing up in a family caught in the
transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist social orders, wooed
and cajoled by their conflicting values, is even more traumatic,
especially when this transition is telescoped into a single
generation and is accompanied by an erosion of material and
social standing.
The 1920's and 1930's were hard times for agricultural commodity
production in Lesotho.
The late 1920's can be pigeonholed as the "take-off" period for
manufacturing and agricultural capital in the Union of South
Africa. The Pact coalition which came to power in 1924
insistently nurtured their development. Among others things the
new government committed itself to boosting maize production on
white farms. This was done artificially by means of preferential
subsidisation and by placing prohibitive tariffs on foreign
products. For the Lesotho economy the results were disastrous,
since it effectively cut off the territories agricultural
producers from their primary markets. (10) The predicament was
worsened by the global depression of the early 1930's which saw a
slump in wool and maize prices — the two principal commodities of
Lesotho's agricultural production. Southern Africa's perrenial
cycles of drought added to the burden, with almost 507. of
Lesotho's livestock dying in 1932-33. (il)
These negative factors combined to accelerate a downward social
and economic spiral, with distressing consequences for all social
strata within the territory. The smaller and poorer households
were the first to succumb to this negative economic pressure.
Between 1921 and 1936 the number of Lesotho men working as
migrant labourers in the Union more than doubled - from 47,141 to
101,273. (12)
Although Leballo's family appear to have been involved in
primary production and must have enjoyed a reasonable amount of
material security ( at least two of its male members were able to
study at Christian institutions in the early 1900's), by the late
1930's their economic standing seems to have declined. There is
no direct evidence to substantiate this, but it can be
confidently inferred from the rapid deterioration of Lesotho's
rural economy in the ensuing decades, and from the financial
difficulties Leballo and his dependants suffered in the immediate
post-war years.
Leballo was in fact to claim that he was personally swept up in
the rising tide of labour migration. In an interview with Bernard
Leman he claimed that as a young teenager he did two stints of
three months each as a "picaninny" to white miners, first at the
Paul flitkuil gold mine in Springs, then at Venter's Post Mine in
Randfontein.(13) This would appear to be chronologically
impossible unless Leballo interrupted his schooling at Masite,
where he completed a teacher's course in 1936 and then worked as
a standard six teacher until the end of 1939.(14)
The circumstantial evidence weighs against Leballo having ever
been a child migrant. Leballo's inclination to treat his
interviews as variants of "likotho tso makoloane" suggests that
although Leballo was not a child migrant, he was quite aware of
the appalling conditions such unfortunate children endured. The
discontinuity of migration, coupled with life in a compound and
arduous labour, was difficult for most adults to bear.
Adjustments were made at staggering personal costs. It takes
little imagination to realise how much damage the severe
deprivations of living in unfamiliar, insecure and chaotic
environments had on the psyche of children and young adolescents.
Add to this trauma the institutionalised and all-pervasive racism
of South Africa and it becomes painfully simple to perceive that
such a fate was especially grim. If Leballo did- manufacture such
an experience into his own childhood then it was because he
realised that it would enhance his standing in the eyes of his
listeners. At the same time Leballo succeeded in drawing
attention to one of the most heinous aspects of Southern African
commodity production.
Leballo's early childhood is not central to this paper. I have
devoted these introductory pages to an overview of that time of
his life, because without it an understanding of his later
contradictory activities would be impossible. Examination of the
formative years of life provides us with a clear picture of the
profound significance of both ideology and material circumstances
in the production of personality. If one is to attempt' to
understand the character and behaviour of an individual, to make
sense of his/her actions or opinions, it is necessary, first and
foremost, to examine the material conditions of that person's
existence. The point is not to simply induce attitudes or
intentions from certain material circumstances. Needless to say
there is no such general correspondence between being and
consciousness, but one cannot begin to understand the state of
mind of the individual without considering his/her material
existence.
From his earliest years Potlako Leballo found himself face to
face with the corrosive tendencies of capitalism. The ossified
social structure into which he was born, and from which he took
emotional and psychic succour, was crumbling around him. Under
these conditions he had to draw on his own resources, materially
limited and mentally considerable as they were, in order to
survive. It should be expected that his actions and their
consequences would sometimes be contradictory and ironic.
The contradictions appear to have remained dormant during those
years when Leballo lived in Lesotho. The security of his home
environment and the relative territorial and political integrity
of the Basotho nation helped to soften the impact of being born
in a generation that bridged "traditional" and "modern" ways of
life.
But by the late 1930's Leballo's life began to change, and the
contradictions of his early conditioning began to manifest
themselves. Though he was to escape proletarianisation (in sharp
contrast to hundreds of thousands from his generation) he was to
respond to the lure of South Africa's burgeoning cities. By the
1930's very few Africans were able to make the leap from rural
homestead to segregated urban township without dropping into the
yawning chasm of wage labour. One of the most dependable
tightropes across this abyss was studying to be a school-teacher.
Leballo's family, like many African families of similar socio-
economic background, had unswerving faith in western education.
Seduced by the new patterns of consumption that were neither
available in rural Lesotho nor affordable on a migrant labourer's
wage, they determined to pay for Leballo's further schooling. In
early 1940 he became a boarder at Lovedale College near Alice in
the Eastern Cape and a student at the prestigious institution's
(teacher) Training School.
This induction into the austere and rather reified grounds of
Africa's oldest and most venerated mission school was to be the
young teenager's rite of passage into South Africa's rapidly
industrialising and intensely racist society. It was to prove to
be an initiation far more lasting in its impact than the rituals
Leballo had undergone a few years earlier at Pitseng.
Not that Leballo absorbed much of the institution's self-
satisfied pedagogy in his first, brief sojourn there, but rather,
with his enrolment at Lovedale, Leballo permanenently broke the
ties that bound him to the rural Lesotho community of his
childhood; a community in which historical consciousness and
culture were still relatively intact. The cultural and
ideological baggage of a pre-capitalist, pastoral society
accompanied him on this great migration. In a paradox, easier to
fathom than the paradox that was the man himself, it was to
become the fulcrum of Leballo's psychic make-up.
But it must have been the competing influences of the
christianised, "modernised" side of Leballo's upbringing that
made him respond to a call by a white man for Africans to enlist
in a white man's army in order to fight in a white man's war.
During the latter half of 1940, Jan Hofmeyer, then minister of
finance in Smuts's cabinet, came to Lovedale College to deliver a
speech concerning World War 2 and the South African governments
decision to commit troops to fight in it.
Leballo, who had been at Lovedale for about half a year, was one
of ' the students who heard Hofmeyer speak. He was sufficiently
impressed with the Minister's description of army life and the
glory of being a soldier that he decided to forsake his
comparativley boring existence as a student.
Leballo's decision to enlist in the Union Defence Force (U.D.F.)
was quite out of line with the general response to the war by
people of his social standing. Most of the educated Africans of
the times had strong anti-war feelings. The awkward loyalty to
"King and Empire" that had prompted many schooled, westernised
Africans to serve in World War One (15) had not survived the
political and economic shocks of the intervening years.
Many Africans had learned from bitter personal experience that
the great western traditions of freedom and democracy that Hitler
was threatening in Europe, and that the white S.A. state was
exhorting them to defend, were being denied to them on a daily
basis inside South Africa itself. This lucidity often found angry
expression. That the agitated critique frequently highlighted the
material basis and repercussions of these denials of political
rights is a clear indication that South Africa's black petty
bourgeoisie was well aware that the racial component of South
African capitalism was slowly pushing them as a class towards
either destitution or proletarianisation.
Some influential, educated blacks argued that there seemed to be
no practical reason for a black man to defend the interests of a
country where "everything worthwhile is a privilege of the white
man." (16) This private comment by the President of the African
National Congress (AMC) was not only more astringent than the
official position of the organisation but also more perceptive of
the links between race, class and social status. At a meeting of
the ANC and the All African Convention (AAC) in Bloemfontein in
August 1940 the two organisations issued a joint statement to the
effect that: "Since the chiefs, who are the rulers of the African
people, have already informed the government that African people
arB loyal to the King of England and the Union Government, we too
affirm that declaration, but we say that the Africans be accepted
as citizens in this country, and be granted citizenship rights,
like other citizens." (17)
Although other factors played a contributory r'ole, financial
matters were the main cause for poor responses to • calls for
recruitment by members of the schooled, upwardly aspiring but
downwardly mobile African petty bourgeoisie. As two of the elder
statesmen of this social class explained: " While pay is by no
means attractive even for the 'mine boy' type of recruit, it is
positively discouraging to the superior type of recruit." (18)
It is therefore not surprising that educated Africans enlisted in
proportionately small numbers. Officially recruitment of soldiers
into the Union Defence Forces (UDF) was voluntary. However the
majority of Africans who enlisted were either forced to do so out
of material need or by the pressure brought to bear, on them by
co-opted tribal chiefs.(19)
It is quite unlikely that Leballo was subject to either of these
pressures. What is more, the Europeanised aspect of his
upbringing had been offset by strong Basotho proto-nationalist
feelings which were also an integral part of his childhood.
Although the belligerent Pan-Africanism for which he was to
become reknowned in later years was still dormant, it is
unlikely that loyalty to King or Union had much to do with
Leballo's decision to enlist in the UDF.
Bernard Leeman (20) who has written the most detailed (and most
partisan) biographical notes on Leballo has argued that Leballo
was inpsired by Hofmeyer's speech to enlist in order to fight
against Nazism. (21) This too appears to be a rather dubious
explanation for Leballo's motives. Rather it is likely that this
was the ironic tack that Hofmeyer chose to take when trying to
convince African youths at an an educational institution to sign
up for the war. It was not uncommon for recruiting propaganda to
urge Africans to fight for freedom and against racism in Europe
with a cynical lack of concern for the spectacular conditions of
class and rsce oppression inside South Africa. (22)
Nonetheless Hofmeyer's speech appeared to have triggered a strong
wanderlust and desire for adventure in the young Leballo's mind.
The fact that Leballo's father had served in a Basotho contingent
in World War 1 (23) provided his naive sense of heroism with
further positive reinforcement.
Realising that if he was to try to enlist in the tiny town of
Alice he would probably be recognised and sent back to school,
Leballo used a sum of money sent to him by his sister to seek out
the anonymity of the big city.(24) He travelled by train to
Johannesburg and then made his way to Krugersdorp where, on the
18th October, 1940, he was attested into the recently created,
Africans only, Native Military Corps (NMC) of the Union Defence
Force (UDF). (see Appendix 1.)
In later years Leballo's prominence in the formation of the Pan
Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) resulted in various
historians paying passing attention to his life experiences.
Roux (1964), Benson (1963), Wai she (1973) and Karis and Carter
(1974) provided brief biographies of the man described by Ngubane
as "the most interesting character in the PAC". (25) All of them




camps to order, regimented neatness, uniforms, respect for rank,
rules against all forms of autonomous thought and action
constituted a typical bureaucratic attempt to impose a wartime
variant of the South African working class way of life on African
troops. This obsession with total social control even made itself
felt beyond the barbed wire fences of the compounds so generously
leased to the army by the mines.
It would be surprising if a gathering of men in single-sex
barracks would not have attracted liquor—selling and
prostitution. Most mining compounds spawned small communities
within walking distance of their gates. The principal commercial
activities in these blighted environments was the peddling of
home-brewed beer and sex. When the white officers of the NMC
marched their new recruits into the premises provided by the
mining companies they immediately inherited what they regarded as
an irksome problem. The patrons of these entrenched underground
commercial activities, who in the pre-war years had serviced the
miners, were soon doing a brisk business with their . new
clientele.
One such "den of iniquity" rubbed shoulders with Kaffirskraal,
the barracks to which Leballo had been detached shortly after
attesting. It was the duty of one 2nd Lieutenant Weller, together
with the fifteen men under his direct command, to patrol the
areas immediately outside the camp. He noted with pious
indignation that "at all times there was a constant flow of
natives, there never seemed less than between 40 to 50 native
visitors in the srea." (43) To make matters worse, white soldiers
from the 1st SA Tank Corps who were stationed in the vicinity
also made regular use of the amenities.
In passing it should be mentioned that it is highly unlikely that
Leballo ever set foot into this sreB during the five weeks that
he was stationed at Kaffirskraal. Since he was then a devout and
puritanical Christian and a teetotaller he would neither have
sought out the comfort of some or other "home girl" who had
fallen on hard times in the city of gold nor chosen to drink of
the vile urban potions that substituted for home brewed beer.
Four months after attesting in Krugersdorp Leballo, now a
corporal, travelled by road convoy to Nairobi. Practically all
black South African troops who served in the Abyssinian campaign
were made to endure this arduous overland safari, while white
soldiers sailed in troop carriers from Durban to Mombasa (44) The
official explanation for the road transportation of troops was
that it was necessary "to harden them to the rigours of battle
conditions." . .
Leballo's convoy arrived in Nairobi on 17 March, 1941. He was
immediately detached to 1st Division Headquarters. Many years
later, when Leballo had become famous enough to grant interviews,
he volunteered very little information about his East African
experiences. His rather bald military service record fails to
provide additional information.(Appendix A.) However it is quite
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likely that Leballo as an M.T. (motorised transport) driver
attached to the 743rd Recce Batallion of the 1st SA Division saw
his share of action.
Leballo's arrival in Kenya coincided with the routing of the
Italians in East Africa and Abyssinia. They had already been
pushed out of Kenya, Egypt and the Sudan. On the very same day
that the convoy which carried Leballo rolled into Nairobi the
allied forces re-captured Berbera, the capital of British
Somali land.
By the 28th March the two ancient Ethiopian cities of Keren and
Harar had been captured. During the.first week of April Addis
Ababa fell. White South African soldiers were amongst the first
to march into the capital, paving the way for the triumphant
return of Emperor Haille Sellasie, head of state of what, until
the Italian invasion of 1936, had been one of only two
internationally recognised independent black African countries.
Enroute to Addis Ababa the South Africans had covered over a
thousand miles in less than three months.
The Eritrean Campaign was an engineering and logistical triumph
as much as a military one. In the annals of South Africa's war
history the East African offensive is singled out as an
unparalleled success. There certainly were frequent and ferocious
clashes with the retreating Italians, but the campaign was won so
convincingly because of the formidable efforts of South African
engineers, road construction workers and M.T. drivers. Not unlike
the commercial world, where the planning and expertise of
management is credited for the windfalls accrued from the
exploitation of labour power, in the Eritrean campaign it was the
elite Engineering Corps, especially the university-trained
officers who received the lion's share of the accolade. One must
look to the footnotes and the parentheses of South Africa's war
histories to find tributes to those many "non—Europeans" who made
a superhuman effort to build roads and bridges under horrendous
conditions and in inhospitable terrain.
In order that the 1st SA Infantry Brigade could enter Addis Ababa
in triumph, and that Prime Minister Jan Smuts could make pious
speeches about the bravery of South Africa's fighting forces,
roads had to be carved out of bush and over high mountain passes,
while bridges that had been dynamited by the retreating Italians
had to be reconstructed.(45)
A Brigadier of the British Engineering Corps remarked:
Only those who knew the lava belt region on the Wajir
road last July, when it murdered transporting, can
appreciate the miracle of the present road. Where one
crawled along at 5 miles per hour it is now possible to
to do 80. The South Africans built a first class road
at the rate of 120 miles per month. In the bush they
cleared rough roads for the advancing troops at the rate
of ten miles a day. (46)
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Ever since Napoleon failed to heed his own maxim that an army
marches on its stomach, military strategists have paid
considerable attention to an army's lines of supply and
communication. In the East African campaign the South African
forces advanced over vast distances in a very short space of
time. One of the most remarkable feats of the war was the way in
which South African combat forces were kept supplied with food,
fuel and ammunition during their lightning drive.
In all probability Leballo was one of the "non—European" M.T.
drivers who, often under enemy fire, ferried up and down the
roads that had been built by the hard labour of his fellow
troops; the largest proportion of whom were black and voteless
South Africans like himself. Their accomplishment is all the more
remarkable when one considers the intense heat ( up to 140
degrees F in the shade), the choking dust arid the torrential
downpours of the East African summer.
One did not have to belong to a combat unit or see action or
carry a rifle in order to be exposed to race/class relations
which were stikingly different from those that were definitive
aspects of the social structure in the Union of South Africa.
Even in colonial East Africa South Africans of all races were
startled to discover that skilled labour (and to a lesser extent
wealth and social status) was not the exclusive preserve of
"Europeans". The mere sight of Africans in Nairobi "driving
engines, working cranes", and holding down white collar jobs
"drove a broad wedge" into their parochial minds.(47)
This was one way in which the historical events of the time
interacted with Leballo's personal biography. A yearning for
adventure, inspired in part by the bellicose past of his
ancestors and the experiences of his father in the South African
Native Labour Contingent (such was the extent to which the glory
of war lost its lustre in a single generation of
proletarianisation) prompted Leballo to enlist in the NMC. As a
result Leballo was able to witness, experience and be profoundly
influenced by social contexts and sequences that had been
stucturally thwarted in South Africa by the region's social and
political development. These sequential contexts must certainly
have helped shape Leballo's views and behaviour.
By June 1941 the South African offensive in Abyssinia was over,
and the triumphant 1st Division was sent to North Africa to
bolster the allied defences in preparation for Rommel's pending
offensive.
On 11th July 1941, Leballo disembarked in Sues, after a tortuous
journey by sea from Mogadishu. Accomodation in the hold, crowded
conditions, vile food, endless inspections, the boarding up of
portholes in accordance with "black out regulations", combined to
turn the voyage into a nightmare. '
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Leballo claimed that the ship carrying his contingent was sunk
between Alexandria and Crete, that he was rescued by a Turkish
ship and somehow returned to the South African Army (48). This is
a surprisingly inaccurate extravagation for Leballo, who as a
general rule tried to provide his exaggerations with a touch of
credibility by being faithful to historical, chronological and
geographical detail.
Leballo certainly did not travel by boat beyond Suez, and his
disembarkation was evidently quite routine (see Appendix 1.)
However on numerous occassions Leballo personally experienced the
terror of a Luftwaffe air attack. The months of July and August
1941 saw almost daily blitzkriegs on the Egyptian towns of Suez,
Alexandria and Cairo. The high explosives and the incendiary
bombs caused heavy casualties, almost all of them being Egyptian
nationals who were unfortunate enough to have been born and to
have lived in one of the third world cities that the axis powers
and the allies had turned into a battleground. (49)
Having endured this fiery introduction to the brutality and
carnage of the North African theatre of war, Leballo was detached
to the 3rd SA Recce Battalion. This was an extremely hazardous
posting because at the time this battalion was scouting behind
enemy lines (50). It would appear that after enduring this
situation for almost two months the ever—resourceful Leballo,
already battle-weary from the East African campaign and the
bombings at Suez, made up his mind to arrange a safer posting.
This is the most plausible explanation for Leballo's sudden
request to be reverted to the ranks (51). Exactly two weeks
after again becoming a private Leballo found himself posted to
the NMC general list and stationed in the somewhat safer
environment of Cairo (see Appendix 1). It most certainly would
have been neither the first nor the last time that he managed
adroitly to avoid abusive and degrading predicaments.
The hardships Leballo endured and the brutality he witnessed in
the months since his flight from Lovedale had presumably
sharpened his perceptions. No longer likely to be taken in by the
cant of ministers or of generals, and increasingly cynical about
the avowedly just ends of the war, Leballo lost interest in the
concepts of honour and heroism and in the bloody battle cries
that they inspired. In the months that preceded the rapid troop
build—up in the desert in response to the assault on the Bazala
line by the Afrika Korps, Leballo kicked his heels in the canal
region. Somehow he had managed to survive the bombardments of
cant as well as shells. With the exception of a two week stint at
the South African Vehicle Re-creation Park in Beneifa (see
Appendix 1) he spent six months in the vicinity of Suez and
Cairo.
It was here that Leballo would have come into regular contact
with soldiers from other allied countries. The comparatively
comradely treatment that he received from some of the British and
Australian troops must have stood in sharp contrast to the kind
of treatment he had been conditioned to expect from people with
white skins.
That this relatively colour blind atmosphere had a significant
impact on most South .Africans can be discerned in the
hysterical responses of some of the white South African troops.
In a letter that was opened by the army censor a white soldier
gave vent to his offended racial arrogance.
They (black South Africans) tell us there is no
colour bar up here. We have to be very careful how
we speak to the bastards, but they can talk as they
like to us... The Tommy is to blame for being friendly
with them and telling them all kinds of b.. s.. (52)
But what threatened many white South African soldiers most of all
and drove the repressed and the reactionary in the Union into
paroxyms of moral frenzy was the fact that the fleshpots of
cities such as Cairo, Alexandria and Jerusalem were available at
the going market prices to all soldiers, irrespective of race.
Thus black South Africans "were allowed to drink in the same
canteens, also in bars in Cairo, and when they get back they will
want to take out our women just as they do here." (53)
Although it is possible that Leballo still foreswore women and
wine, (the heavy—handed Anglican influence of his childhood
making him deem such sinful distractions as being taboo for all
men) the racial and national polyglot of allied occupied Cairo
made a lasting impact on his psyche.
Given his skilful avoidance of combat and the consciousness
raising contradiction of being racially oppressed in an army that
was ostensibly fighting for freedom, Leballo was the
quintessential anti-heroic hero.
However it is a peculiarity of the current era that the myth of
the sweetness of sacrifice, of death in the name of a cause, has
found a new priesthood to peddle it - the leaders and the cadres
of national liberation movements. Thus Leballo, an anti-hero of
World War 2, was to be transformed into pseudo—hero by Leballo
the famous political leader. The man who managed to avoid going
to the front, no matter how hard history tried to nudge him
there?, was to be transformed by the man himself into "that fool
of a Herostrate, ... (who) set fire to the temple of the goddess
at Ephesus, merely in order to get his name into the ... school
reading books." (54)
In contrast to the reticence Leballo showed when it came to
discussing his personal experience of the Eritrean campaign, he
was expansive about, his participation in the desert war of North
Africa. Never one to miss the opportunity to embellish the
humdrum tapestry of everyday life with vivid embroidery, Leballo
reconstructed his North African adventure with characteristic
grandiloquence. In interviews with prominent researchers Leballo
insisted that he was twice taken prisoner, first at Sidi Rezegh
and then again at Tobruk, and that he was court-martialed and
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given a death sentence (commuted by General Alexander) for
leading a revolt against discriminatory practices in the UDF
(55).
These two claims are so startling that they warrant close
examination, but befqre that can be done some elaboration is
necessary.
If one reconstructs Leballo's personal account from the
interesting items that are scattered in numerous sources (56)
the following colourful picture emerges. Leballo was captured at
Sidi Rezegh, after a German tank had flushed him out of the
foxhole in which he had been hiding. Fortunately for Leballo,
though, this imprisonment was brief, since he was released almost
immediately by an allied counter-attack. He was recaptured at
Tobruk, was sent to an Italian Prisoner, of War camp in the desert
and from there to Germany where he was held in a camp near
Dresden. After Dresden Leballo was sent to Hamburg, where he
remained until the end of the war. After being debriefed in
England he sailed back home to South Africa (57).
It is tempting not to violate this Lithoko Tso Makoloane, to
neither gut the poetry nor pare away the poetic license. What is
of relevance here are the general social events the story bears
testimony too, and not the life of the individual, embossed as it
is by these appropriated experiences.
J,
The naked facts, though not nearly as flattering to Leballo, bear
equally eloquent social testimony.
By the end of the war some 1,600 members of the NMC had been
taken prisoner by the enemy. 1264 of them, along with 8960
whites, 380 "coloureds" and 118 Indians were captured at the fall
of Tobruk on the 21st June 1941. The Germans raised the ire of
some of the white non—ranking soldiers by incarcerating them in
the same pens as their "non-white" countrymen. Quite clearly
recalcitrant in regard to the official ideology of the Nazi
state, the German soldiers scornfully dismissed a request from
white South Africans for racially segregated lock-ups. This was
perhaps one of the most unequivocal incidents of racial equality
between black and white South African soldiers throughout the
war.
In many prisoner of war camps, whether in the Libyan desert or in
Europe, bugs, fleas, lice and rats were'indiscriminate in their
infestation of barracks and the spreading of discomfort and
disease. The constant shortage of food, compounded by the
frequent delay or non-arrival of Red—Cross parcels resulted in
death being a constant menace for many prisoners of war. If
anything those black South African prisoners who were housed in
particularly miserable camps were in graver risk than their
counterparts.. This was in part because the UDF spent only 9d per
day on Red Cross-organised ration allowances for African
prisoners of war in comparison to 2s for "Europeans" (58) In
notorious camps such as Babenhausen and Chartes numerous soldiers
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guns and 3120 rounds of ammunition had disappeared (77).
Theft of ammunition most frequently coincided with acts of
collective resistance. At least fifteen incidents of rioting were
recorded in a single year - from November 1942 to October
1943.(see appendix 2 ) . This is a startling statistic, given the
repressive conditions in army barracks, the limited resources
available to potential mutineers, the isolation of the different
units and the brute force at the disposal of loyal troops. In
quite a number of the incidents that occurred in 1942/1943, the
commanding officers of the rioting troops had to call for outside
assistance, which, without fail, arrived in the form of white
infantry—men backed up with tanks.
Such was the case at Palmietkuil South, on 20th January, 1943
when NMC details, having failed to break into the armoury, used
their assegais to hold the commanding officer and one other
officer hostage. This incident ended without death or injury, but
with heavy-handed punishment for the rioters. By contrast the
first of three riots that year at Zonderwater camp, resulted in
23 troops from the Cape Corps being admitted to hospital with
serious injuries. In protest against the arrest of one of the
members of the battalion by the military police a large group of
soldiers threw stones at their white officers and then later at
an armed guard that had been posted at the main gate. Injuries
would have been more extensive and evenly distributed between
rioting black soldiers and ordet—restoring white soldiers had the
former been armed.(78)
The second riot at Zonderwater on 13th June, 1943, was triggered
when an entire company refused to parade for guard mounting.
Things soon turned nasty. The men's canteen and the sergeants'
mess were set ablaze. The fire detail that was sent to put out
the fires was pelted with rocks and battles. In the supression
that followed, after "European" military police had arrived, two
European officers were injured. Twenty—nine rioters were admitted
to hospital, three of them in critical condition. (79)
The compilers of these records, normally the commanding officers
of the disaffected troops, wasted little time in trying to
discover the root causes of these grievances. Their devotion to
discipline and routine ensured that their sole pre-occupation was
to break the riots as quickly as possible. The ignomy of being
the officer in charge of rioting troops was assauged by a prompt
and efficient return to' order, not by any tortuous exegesis of
delinquent behaviour.
That was left to the high command. Stubbs was convinced that the
primary reason for this epidemic of disturbances was "the
inadequacy from a point of view of suitability" (80) of white
officers. As the administrator of what he himself called "the
cinriarella of the Services", Stubbs had to settle for lording it
over white officers between the ages of 40 and 60, none of whom
were "in the A medical category" (81). He appears to have
confused this slight to his self esteem with the material
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conditions that gave rise to these "increasing incidents of
insubordination".
Nor was Colonel Stubbs one to avoid the occassional comment on
ethnology. In another letter to the Adjutant General, also
devoted to the riotous behaviour of black soldiers, Stubbs
ventured to postulate about "the inherent grave defects" of the
"coloured" people of South Africa, " which can only be partially
overcome by careful handling." He added:
Their reknowned addiction to alcohol, spirits
especially, has revealed the existence of short-
comings in their racial and individual character.
This fundamental flaw ... has inevitably affected
their moral attitude, producing in its wake,
lawlessness and arrogance ... (82)
The wife of one Cape Corps soldier suffered too much from
material deprivation as a result of her husband's low wages to
bother about bridging the conceptual domains of race and
individual character. In a letter to her husband she wrote:
"We women", mothers and wifes has found that it
is not worth that you men should ever have
joined up because the government is not fair to us ...
You know here are 1000's of coloured men who does
not want to join because of the little pay ... I
often wonder what does a wife with 6 or 8 children
do. I only got 2 and find it a struggle." (83)
The return from the slightly less fettered social environment at
the frontlines to the deep-seated disaffection in the Union camps
must have pushed Leballo's mind towards political maturity. It is
interesting to note, however, that Leballo, who was to become a
founder and leader of South Africa's most militant and dogmatic
nationalist organisation, made no mention of his post 1943 army
experiences. Instead he seduced his biographers with praise-
poems. After all, that is probably what he thought they wanted to
hear.
It would be mistaken to accuse Leballo of lying, although like
most humans he sometimes did. Rather Leballo selects, re—arranges
and reconstructs. The symbolical interpretations with which he
endows certain episodes in his life create a somewhat distorted
picture of the major social forces at work in the contexts he
describes. To reject Leballo's mythological re-arrangements of
his life-experiences on the grounds of their inaccuracy would be
to close off a potentially fruitful line of exploration into
social process and the dialectical relationship between material
events and individual consciousness.
By digging through the topsoil of fabrications, the social
researcher eventually reaches the bedrock of experiences from
which they have evolved. Thus Leballo's extensively documented
responses to his own life (as I hope I have shown) combine to
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form an intricate maize which leads to a sober confrontation with
actual social conditions. In turn it is only once one has come to
grips with the relevance of the intricate web of variables that
made up life in the NMC during World War 2 that one can begin to
understand the myriad of meanings embodied in Leballo's
"lithoko".
The cliche which likens life to a drama evokes a fact so obvious
as to need no discussion. There is widespread confusion between
play-acting and real life. In the arena of political protest it
is the demagogues in particular who fuse organised appearances
with real life. They reify lived experience at the same time
that they give it popular expression.
It was primarily as an orator that Potlako Leballo was to achieve
political prominence. His talent for manipulating language and
dramatising actual events earned him - and eventually cost him
the leadership of the PAC. It is therefore appropriate for a
social historian to stack his frequently manufactured
achievements against the real experiences of common people. In
the process one is able to show that in order to become great men
or women, leaders frequently step beyond and stoop below the
reality of the smallest individual life.
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APPENDIX 1
RECORD OF SERVICE
Leballo Potlako Kitchener. N4826.
Dependants: Wife, child, sister, grandmother.
Pre enlistment occupation: Scholar Lovedale College.
Attested Krugersdorp
NMC General List.
Promoted to corporal
Detached to 1st S.A. Tank Corps (Kaffirskraal)
Arrived Nairobi by road convoy
Detached to IDiv HQ
Reprimanded for contravention Sect 15(2) Military
Disciplinary Code *
11. 7.41 Disembarked Suez
Detached 743 Rec. 1st Battalion. SA Division
Posted to 3rd SA Recce Battalion
Reverted to rank of private at own request
Posted to Eeneral List NMC
Detached South African Vehicle Recreation Park **
Posted 204 Motorised Transport Company (Reserve)
Promoted to Corporal
NMC General List
Returned to Union (Undesirable)
NEAS Pretoria
Awarded African Service Medal
On strength G.S.C./NEAS Pretoria
Detached to NMC Pretoria
Promoted to Sergeant
Asks to be detached
Last day in UDF
Left dispersal depot
EFFECTIVE SERVICE: 1917 days
DETENTION: Nil
NOT A PRISONER OF WAR
NON-CLAIMANT OF PENSION
CAMPAIGNS: MEFUNION
RECEIVED: 1939-1945 Star; Africa Star and 8th Army clasp; The War
Medal (1939/45); Africa Service Medal;Defence Medal ****
RESEARCHER'S NOTES;
* Absent from duty without official leave
** Linked to SA Technical Services Corps, based at Geneifa, 20
miles north of Sues
*** attached to 1st SA Division, 8th Army, based at Tahag,
moved between Gasala and El Alamain
**** Awarded to all troops who were in the theatres of war.
COMPILED FROM LEBALLO'S RECORD OF SERVICE AND OTHER DOCUMENTS IN
HIS PERSONAL FILE. (SADF PERSONNEL. PRETORIA.)
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APPENDIX 2
LIST OF REPORTED RIOTS, NMC, NOVEMBER 1942 - OCTOBER 1943.
DALE
25/11/42
30/11/42
23/12/42
10/ 1/43
14/ 1/43
20/ 1/43
4/ 2/43
7/ 3/43
9/ 3/43
17/ 3/43
3/ 4/43
28/ 4/43
13/ 6/43
28/ 6/43
25/10/43
PLACE OFFICIAL CAUSE
Port Alfred
Okavanqo (Bechuanaland)
Boschpoort (Warmbaths)
Matatiele
Woodbrook (E. London)
Palmietkuil South
Zonderwater
Border Location
Lenz (Kliptown)
Boschpoort
Walvis Bay
Remount Depot (Standerton)
Zonderwater
Eshowe
Zonderwater
Public Violence.
Misbehaviour, recruits.
Hunger Strike, defiance
Clash with black civilians.
Living Conditions.
Took 0C hostage.
Stone Throwing.
Clash with black civilians
3 dead, 14 injured.
Clash btwn Owambo & Sotho.
"Faction Fight"
Public Violence.
Stone Throwing. Strike
Riots, Arson.
Rioting. Public Violence.
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